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Abstract
In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between software
protection and piracy rates using a panel data set for 24 European countries.
In addition, a new measure of software protection is constructed. We ﬁnd
evidence that software protection has a signiﬁcant negative effect on piracy
rates. We also ﬁnd that per capita income has a signiﬁcant negative effect on
piracy rates. Additionally, the above ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of
other descriptors suggested by the empirical literature on piracy.
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The increase of piracy is a phenomenon that in recent years has greatly affected
markets for information goods such as business and entertainment software ap-
plications, sound recordings, movies, and books. Without doubt, the emergence
of digital technologies has provided the opportunity for copyright violations on a
much larger scale than it ever was and has raised serious concerns on actual intel-
lectual property rights (IPRs) system. Nowadays, there is an intensive debate over
how IPR should be adapted and structured. At this respect, for instance, the EU
software developers have expressed serious concerns over the prospective EU en-
largement because thousands of illegal copies may be brought into the European
market. Obviously, cross border regulations will be of critical importance within
the EU Antipiracy policy. Third, new legal criteria, as Part III of the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), have assumed
a crucial position to ﬁght against piracy1.
Since piracy affect mostly business software application and since legal rules
such as enforcement measures are considered as vital for the prospective develop-
ment of software industry, the relationship is of great importance.
To date, no empirical paper has examined the impact of software protection on
piracy levels in European countries2. The majority of empirical studies on piracy
has adopted a cross–section estimation method and therefore has the weaknesses
of not being able to account for changes over time and unobserved heterogeneity.
In the current paper, we estimate a panel data model using data for 24 European
countries over a period of three years: 1994, 1997 and 2000. Panel data methods
allow control for omitted variables bias and improving the accuracy of parameter
1Arts 41–61 provide explicitly enforcement measures.
2Another related branch of the empirical literature has examined the impact of IPR protection on economic growth,
trade ﬂows and technology licensing using IPR scores. Mansﬁeld (1994), Seyoum (1996), Maskus and Penubarti (1995),
Maskus (2001), and Yang and Maskus (2001), among others.
2estimates. Furthermore, we also contributes to the existing empirical literature on
cross national IP measures by developing one of the ﬁrst software protection in-
dexes that takes explicitly into account statutory law as well as their enforcement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy reviews
the existing literature on measures of IPRs protection. Section 3 describes the
index of software protection. The variables used in the empirical analysis are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 addresses the econometric speciﬁcation. In
Section 6, the estimation results are presented. Section 7 contains a conclusion
and suggestions for future research.
2 Measures of IPRs
Anumberofresearchershaveattemptedtoquantifycross–nationallyIPprotection
measures. A study by Rapp and Rozek (1990) was the ﬁrst to construct a IP
measure. The RR index considered 159 countries and focused on patent laws
rather than other forms of IP protection. Their measure ranged from zero to ﬁve.
Its main disadvantage is that belongs to the transition period.
The RR index was considerably extended by Ginarte and Park (GP) (1997).
The GP index covers 110 countries for the period 1960–1990 and focuses on the
strength of patent rights. Their index accounts for ﬁve categories of patent laws:
(1) extent of coverage, (2) duration of protection, (3) membership in international
patent conventions, (4) provisions of loss of protection and (5) enforcement mech-
anisms. Each of the categories is codiﬁed between 0 and 1. In their index, each of
the categories are given equal weights. Like in RR, their index varies from zero to
ﬁve where zero represents a country with no patent protection and ﬁve represents
a country with the highest level of protection. For the purpose of this study, how-
ever, the GP measure is not appropriate because it assess the strength of patent
3laws rather than copyright laws and measures the laws on the books but not their
actual enforcement.
As Ostergard (2000) noted, enforcement aspects might have a crucial impact
on the level of protection enjoyed in a particular country. The Ostergard’s mea-
sure includes 20 countries for the years 1988, 1991 and 1994. His copyright index
ranges from zero to 10 while the enforcement component ranges from zero to
four where a higher value corresponds to a higher level of enforcement. The ad-
vantages of the Ostergard index are quantifying several forms of IP protection
(patents, copyrights and trademarks) and accounting and accounting for enforce-
ment issues as well as law on the books. However, his measure is only available
for only 12 countries of the 24 countries for which we have piracy data and we
only observe it in 1994.
In summary, patent rights indexes has been widely used in empirical studies.
Furthermore, none of these studies has attempted to quantify the level of software
protection across European countries. Speciﬁcally, in the next section, I build a
software protection index used in this empirical investigation.
3 Measuring Software Protection in Europe
As mentioned, one of the objectives of this study is the construction of a software
protection measure across European countries. This is complicated by the fact that
many national copyright laws are not available in English and any IP protection
measure might be subject to subjectivity and criticism itself.
As regards as software protection concerned, computer programs may qual-
ify for several methods of IP protection (patents, copyright and trade secrets).
The EU law protects computer software as “literary works” (Art. 1, Council Di-
4rective 91/250/EEC). This in line with other international agreements3. What is
really protected is the expression of a computer program4 against unauthorized
duplication. Ideas do not enjoy copyright protection (Art. 2, Council Directive
91/250/EEC). Thus, our analysis focused on this mechanism of IP protection5.
In the spirit of Ginarte and Park (1997), our index of software protection is
composed of two dimensions: statutory law and enforcement. In the subsequent
subsections, a brief description of each of these components and reasoning for use
them are provided.
3.1 Law component
The law component contains information on two categories: membership in inter-
national copyright treaties and statutory enforcement measures.
² International Copyright Conventions
The protection of software across national borders relies on several interna-
tional agreements on intellectual property. The main international copyright con-
ventions are: the Berne Convention for the protection of artistic and literary works
(1886)6, the WIPO copyright Treaty (1996) and the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 1994).
Many scholars have also used country’s membership in international conven-
tions as crude indicator of the strength of a country’s IP law (Ferrantino, 1993;
3See, Art. 11 of the TRIPS agreement (1995), Art. 4 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) and the Berne Convention
(1971).
4Theexpressionofacomputerprogramencompasses: operatingsystems, applicationprograms, programminglanguage
and manuals.
5Over the last ten years, an intense debate has emerged in relation to whether and to what extent should be patentable.
By contrast, computer programs are patentable in the US.
6Although, the Berne Convention does not explicitly include computer programs to qualify for protection. However,
the deﬁnition of literary and artistic works” is extremely broad and thus can encompass computer software. It has been
revised and amended various times: revised at Berlin (1908), revised at Rome (1928), at Brussels (1948), at Stockholm
(1967), and at Paris (1971), and amended in 1979 (Berne Union).
5Burke, 1996; Rapp and Rozek, 1990; Hogenbirk and Van Kranenburg, 2003). It is
argued that country’s membership any convention may be a signal that its national
law recognizes the principle of national treatment and certain period of protection.
In addition, we have explicitly incorporated the 1994 TRIPS agreement adminis-
tered by the WIPO because it establishes certain minimum standards in matter
of enforcement for WTO members. We believe that it is essential that our index
reﬂect how WTO members are making adjustments in their enforcement practices
to bring them in compliance with TRIPS.
² Judicial measures
Obviously, international membership is a poor software protection indicator.
Enforcement measures take enormous relevance due to the emphasis placed on
them by recent international copyright conventions. Most European countries
stand in line with TRIPs recommendations in matter of enforcement efforts but
in some cases, there is a urgent need to reform legal system and its administration
in light of the latest reports conducted by several international organizations.
In line with Ginarte and Park (1997), this study considers the presence or ab-
sence of the following statutory enforcement measures but it focuses on statutory
enforcement measures for computer programs. The judicial measures included
are: ex–parte civil search, border measures and remedies. They are based on what
is written down in national copyright laws. Even if they are changed, it is possible
to compute exact values for each period of time, considering the current copyright
law at present. This source of information was supplemented with Civil and Penal
Codes.
² Ex–parte Civil Search Order
6A legal procedure which has been regularly implemented against pirates of
copyright material is the Anton Piller order7. This legal term describes a search
conducted upon the application of the copyright holder without prior notice ﬁled
withacourt, whereinthecopyright–holderallegesaninfringementofarightlikely
to cause harm and or where there is a enough risk of evidence of being destroyed.
If granted, the court will allow the plaintiff to enter the workplace or residence of
another in search for documents, software, etc for preserve it or to obtain evidence
that may be improperly withheld.
² Border Measures
This legal term refers to acts where the copyright holder may ﬁle in an ap-
plication to the custom authorities to suspend the entry of pirated goods (illegal
software). In most European laws, there also exists a chance custom ofﬁcials may
act ex–ofﬁcio (by surprise). As a general rule, the goods proved be pirated through
a ﬁnal decision of a court will be destroyed or rendered to the copyright holder8.
² Remedies
Another usual enforcement measure is the availability of remedies such as
seizure and destruction of infringing copies as well as materials and equipment
used for their reproduction.
7This rules derives from the English case Anton Piller K.G.V. Manufacturing Process LTD in 1976.
8As regards to European customs action against infringements to intellectual property rights, the legal framework is
the Council Regulation 3295/94 of 22 December 1994. Its effects extended to infringement of copyright and other similar
rights and also to export and re–export. Lastly, the custom authorities were given greater scope for action and were allowed
to act ex–ofﬁcio. In 1999 Council Regulation No. 241/99 substantially amended the 1994 Regulation, broadening its scope
to patents and supplementary certiﬁcates, as well as to the protection of Community trademarks at customs via an uniform
system of protection in all Member States. Similarly, intervention was extended to infringing goods whatever their customs
status.
7Thelawcomponentisquantiﬁedasthesumoftwocategoriesequallyweighted
and ranges from zero to two where higher values indicate a stronger software pro-
tection on the books9.
3.2 Enforcement component
It should be noted that the legal procedures above mentioned reﬂect a potential
assessment of the form and degree of a particular country to comply with general
provisions of the IP law not as they are actually implemented.
In the current paper, we also quantify the enforcement aspect of IPRs regime.
We use actual placements on the Special 301 Watch list in coding the enforce-
ment component10. In the USTR’s list countries are ranked from the lowest to
strictest degree of IP enforcement. Thus, countries whose acts, policies or prac-
tices have the greatest adverse impact on relevant U.S. products are categorized as
Priority Foreign Countries (PFC). The Priority Watch list (PWL) and Watch list
(WL) identify those countries which have serious deﬁciencies in matter of IPRs.
Countries which have minor deﬁciencies are placed on Other Observations (OO).
The enforcement component ranges from 1 to 4 where higher values correspond
to a higher levels of enforcement. Table 1 lists the coding criteria.
To get the overall score of index for each country and period of time, the
law component was multiplied by the enforcement dimension (A complete list of
components is presented in Appendix). Table 7 displays the index values over
the periods of time 1994, 1997 and 2000 (see, Appendix). The reason of choosing
only three periods of time is because one would not expect laws were to vary much
9One might argue that this assumption is very restrictive and that each category should be weighted according to their
importance. One question arises, what is the most important treaty?. Subjective criteria should be introduce by the fact
that no theoretical framework exists indicating the relative importance of each factor.
10For example, Smarzynska (2002) uses the same enforcement component to examine the impact of IPRs on foreign
direct investment.
8Table 1: Enforcement coding
Value Description
1 Priority Watch List (PWL)
2 Watch List (WL)
3 Other observations (OO)
4 No reported problems
Source: IIPA Special 301 reports
annually and the earliest piracy data date back to the year 1994. On average, the
highest scores were obtained by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands
and Switzerland (7.11) while Russia had the lowest score (0.78). The average
value of the index is 4.87.
Finally, as a check, the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients between our index and
similar indexes used in the literature are shown in Table 2. All correlations have
a positive sign as expected. The highest correlation of our index was with Ginarte
and Park’s measure11. RR and Ostergard measures are moderately correlated with
our index.
4 The variables
In this section, we describe the explanatory variables and endogenous variable.
Sample statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis are reported in
Table 4.
11I would like to thank Walter Park for kindly providing the updated version of the index.
9Table 2: Correlation matrix of IP measures
Year RR GP OS
(N=15) (N=21) (N=19)
2000 0.27 0.54 0.52
1997 0.30 0.48 0.37
1994 0.53 0.69 0.57
Note: RP = Rapp and Rozek (1990); GP = Ginarte and Park (1997) and
Ostergard (2000). Correlation are computed for all years for which our soft-
ware protection score is available. N= number of observations
4.1 Dependent variable
In this paper, the dependent variable is the piracy rate. Annual national software
piracy rates are compiled by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and the Soft-
ware Information Industry Association (SIIA) for eighty countries since 1994.
We have only considered observations from individual countries where we have
the piracy rate. Thus, we net out merged observations corresponding to Croa-
cia/Ukraine.
Piracy rates are computed as the difference between software programs in-
stalled (demand side) and software applications legally licensed (supply)12. Thus,
piracy rates are deﬁned as the volume of software pirated as a percent of total
software installed in each country. Piracy rates range from 0 % to 100 % (all soft-
ware installed is pirated). It is important to emphasize that piracy rates are only
estimates. The BSA’s piracy data suffers from the fact that a large part of software
is sold without the computer hardware. This might introduce some sort of bias in
the reported piracy rates. Despite of these shortcomings, they have been widely
12Further information on the methodology employed to construct piracy rates can be found in the recent report on Global
Software Piracy elaborated by the BSA and SIIA (2000).
10used in empirical models of piracy (Givon, Mahajan and Muller, 1995; Husted,
2000; Marron and Steel, 2000 ; Hogenbirk and Van Kranenburg, 2003;).
Table 3 presents data on estimated rates of piracy and the associated lost rev-
enues for business software applications over the period of study. The mean piracy
rate was 55.36 and the median was 51.5. Average piracy rates decreased substan-
tially from 1994 to 2000 (30 %).
As regards as piracy ranking across European countries concerned, in some
Eastern countries, all software installed is pirated. For instance, Russia, had a
piracy rate of 88 % in 2000. Czech. Rep had the lowest piracy rate in this region
at 43 %. In Western Europe, Greece was the country with the highest piracy rate
at 66 %. Other countries, for instance, Denmark and United Kingdom, in contrast
had piracy rates in business software applications of 26 %. Overall, the average
software piracy rate is at a higher level in Eastern Europe than that in Western
Europe. Theaveragepiracylevelofcountriesincludedinthisstudywasof46%in
2000 while Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Denmark
and UK were the only countries with piracy rates below world average piracy rate
at 37%.
Interestingly, it can be seen that countries are not affected in the same way
for piracy. Richer nations register lower piracy rates but their total piracy loss is
higher due to higher usage rates.
4.2 Explanatory variables
In the formal literature, the relationship between income and piracy is far from
being clear. Some authors conﬁrm a negative relationship between piracy rates
and income (Burke, 1996; Husted, 2000; Marron and Steel, 2000; Ramello and
Silva, 2000; Gopal and Sanders, 1998 and Cheng et al., 1997). It is argued that the
higher the level of economic development, the less likely illegal activities replace
11Table 3: Estimated piracy rates and lost revenues
Year 1994 1997 2000
Country piracy rate revenue piracy rate revenue piracy rate revenue
(%) ($ th.) (%) ($ th.) (%) ($ th.)
Austria 47 41,223 40 41,620 37 70,748
Belgium 53 41,223 36 51,485 33 53,767
Denmark 48 67,300 32 45,787 26 40,076
Finland 53 56,081 38 37,754 29 39,135
France 53 421,145 44 407,900 40 480,064
Germany 48 671,068 33 508,884 28 635,264
Greece 87 28,845 73 44,546 66 61,542
Ireland 74 30,590 65 46,847 41 77,399
Italy 69 288,490 43 271,714 46 421,942
Netherlands 64 206,706 48 195,098 40 227,595
Norway 53 80,092 46 104,337 35 64,292
Portugal 65 36,091 51 40,991 42 23,609
Spain 77 190,746 59 167,288 51 168,514
Sweden 54 151,993 43 127,051 35 92,889
Switzerland 38 65,842 39 92,898 34 91,093
UK 42 370,793 31 334,527 26 530,787
Bulgaria 94 19,269 93 13,171 78 10,019
Czech Republic 66 97,150 52 51,972 43 44,674
Hungary 76 101,902 58 25,488 51 41,252
Poland 77 208,176 61 107,625 54 103,531
Romania 93 19,025 84 15,297 77 20,918
Russia 95 516,254 89 251,837 88 108,983
Slovakia 66 23,683 58 17,018 45 6,866
Slovenia 96 19,082 76 9,198 61 11,743
Average 66.74 161,372 54.61 128,646 46.65 146,673
Source: Eighth Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study. Trends in Soft-
ware Piracy 1994–2002.
legal ones.
In contrast, in a study of 39 countries, Hogenbirk and Van Kranenburg (2003),
found a signiﬁcant negative association between the income and the piracy rates.
12In a panel data study, Kurtz et al. (2002), found that per capita income was nega-
tively associated with the piracy rates of nations.
Per capita income is employed to measure economic development. Data on
GDP per capita come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI,
2003). Per capita GDP in 1995 US dollars is used. The income variable is intro-
duced in natural log in the estimates since we expect a non–linear relationship
between piracy and income as indicated in previous studies (Marron and Steel,
2000).
Tounderstandpiracyrates, informationaboutIPlawiscrucial. Mostempirical
studies of piracy have relied on international copyright membership as a standard
proxy of the strength of national IP systems assuming such measure is appropri-
ate. It is believed that the stronger the IP protection the less likely is that piracy
happens. To date, empirical evidence is mixed. Burke (1996) estimated a multino-
mial logit model to explore the determinants of audio piracy levels. He found that
copyright membership was not really effective in lowering audio piracy levels.
More recently, Hogenbirk and Van Kranenburg (2003) examined the relationship
between copyright protection and piracy rates over countries. Software protec-
tion was negatively associated with piracy rates, indicating that strong copyright
protection might result in lower piracy rates.
One alternative explanation comes from the literature on criminal behavior.
Piracy can be seen as a criminal act, and thus, the existence of strong copyright
systems might increase the opportunity costs of piracy and therefore decreases the
likelihood of piracy (Ehrlich, 1973). Unfortunately, we do not have information
on penalties which are expected to be an important predictor when discussing
issues of piracy. In this study, we have included a measure of software protection
(SOFT).
Data collection on legal rules of copyright were explicitly concerned with in-
13dex of software protection. The principal sources of all legal data were: World
Intellectual property Organization (WIPO), United Nations Educational, Scien-
tiﬁc and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Trade Organization
(WTO). This information was supplemented by the criminal and civil codes in
force and the text of national copyright laws.
Toassesstherobustnessofourempiricalspeciﬁcationmeasuresofeducational
attaintment, scientiﬁc infrastructure and political rights and civil liberties have
been also included in cross–country piracy studies. In general, the empirical evi-
dence supports the notion that higher stock of human capital leads to lower piracy
rates. Data on average years of schooling for people above 25 years (EDUC) are
taken from Barro–Lee’s dataset (2000). Countries with missing values on EDUC
for the sample period are assigned the most recent observation available.
The question of whether R& D has a statistically signiﬁcant effect on piracy
has been investigated by a number of researchers, including Marron and Steel,
2000; Kurt et al., 2002. The general conclusions appears to be that the measures
of scientiﬁc infrastructure are typically inversely related to piracy rates. Data on
R&D expenditures as a share of real GDP are taken from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicator (WDI, 2003). For some countries, R & D data are missing.
We linearly interpolated values of the R& D variable for those countries with no
recent observations available.
The motivation to include the FI variable is to shed some light the extent to
which piracy is connected to political systems. It seems to be reasonable to expect
that capitalistic countries have lower piracy rates. Marron and Steel (2000) found
that the freedom index was not signiﬁcantly associated with the national piracy
rates. The data source for freedom index is the Freedom of House (2001).
14Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (NT= 72)
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Std Dev Min Max
PR piracy rate (%) 55.36 19.32 26 96
PCGDP real per capita GDP 18,952.38 13,003.83 1,310 46,777
(in 1995 US)
SOFT software protection index 4.87 2.42 0.67 8
R & D R & D expenditures (% GDP) 1.52 0.82 0.37 3.80
EDUC average years of schooling 8.87 1.51 4.33 11.86
in population > 25 years
FI freedom index 1.56 0.73 1 5
5 Economic modelling
In this section, we describe the estimation procedure. Using the subscripts i and t
to denote the country and year, we estimate a ﬁxed effects model to examine the
effects of software protection on piracy rates using data for 23 countries for 1994,
1997 and 2000. The baseline model employed in this paper is the following
yit = X
0
it ¯ + Z
0
it ° + ®i + ²it (1)
where yit is the natural log of the piracy rate, Xit is a vector of explanatory vari-
ables that vary over countries and over time and that includes income and software
protection variables, Zit is a vector of additional regressors that are expected to
inﬂuence piracy rates as well. The time invariant effects ®i that appear in eq. (1)
control for the unobserved country ﬁxed effects. These country speciﬁc effects
might reﬂect factors such as persistent differences in tastes for piracy in a given
country and national culture which may not be captured by the set of regressors
included in our speciﬁcation and ²it are the usual random disturbance terms, as-
sumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero and constant variance.
15We know that the OLS estimator is biased (inconsistent) if the individual ef-
fects ®i are correlated with the explanatory variables xit and zit. Between model
estimates are unbiased only if the individual effects are uncorrelated with xit and
zit.
One alternative is to consider the FE (covariance) estimator that wipes out the
unobserved individual heterogeneity using the within transformation of eq. (1).
The covariance estimator relies on enough within variation across countries and
over time and assumes that ®i are correlated with the set of regressors included
in the model. One disadvantage of this modelling approach is that the FE cannot
estimate the effect of any time invariant variable.
Finally, there are some potential issues associated with the software protec-
tion variable. The level of protection enjoyed in a particular country might be
endogeneously determined as well as subject to measurement error.
The use of instrumental variables techniques addresses these issues. We use
variables correlated with the software protection but uncorrelated with the error
term. As instruments, we use the measure of quality bureaucracy and rule of law
provided by Kaufmann et al. (2003). These measures do not include a measure of
property rights and therefore we do not expect a problem of endogeneity.
Given that the number of instruments exceeds the number of regressors to be
instrumented, the model is overidentiﬁed. With an overidentiﬁed model, we can
test whether our instruments are valid for the level of piracy.
6 Estimation Results
Before proceeding we run a pooled OLS regression where we restrict the inter-
cept coefﬁcient to be the same across countries. We then examine whether the
intercepts vary over countries using a F–test (see, Baltagi, 2001). The F–test (p-
value = 0.000) reveals the existence of heterogenous intercepts across countries
16and therefore pooled OLS is biased and inconsistent since it omits the country
speciﬁc effects in the estimation. We conclude that the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity is statistically important in our sample.
A Ramsey’s (1969) regression speciﬁcation error test (RESET) suggests that
there might not be inconsistency due to omitted variables (p–value=0.32). Finally,
the hypothesis of a normal distribution of residuals in each equation was tested
using Jarque Bera’s (1987) statistical test13.
The empirical results of the baseline speciﬁcation are presented in Table 5.
Column (1) contains the ﬁxed effects estimates after applying OLS to the data in
levels. We observe that all variables included in our study are statistically signif-
icant and have the anticipated signs. Together with the set of ﬁxed effects, these
two variables capture 95% of the variation in piracy rates across countries, and
thus indicating a good performance for the regression model.
We ﬁnd that PCGDP has a negative signiﬁcant impact on piracy rates. The
estimated coefﬁcient for income (and its t statistic) is ¡1:54(¡9:20). Countries
cannot afford laws if they are relatively poor. Since the is expressed in logarithms,
we can interpret the coefﬁcient in terms of elasticities. If the per capita income is
increased by 1%, piracy rates fall by 1.54%.
As expected, the SOFT coefﬁcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. The interpretation of the coefﬁcient is that as the level of
software protection increases, the piracy rates decrease. Apparently, individuals
perceive higher levels of protection as more harmful and pirate less as a result.
Given that our estimates may be inconsistent due to the possibility of simul-
taneity bias introduced by using software protection (SOFT) as regressor. Column
(2) presents the ﬁxed effects 2SLS estimates14. We also report the F–test for the
13In all regressions, the JB accepts the null hypothesis of normality of residuals on conventional signiﬁcance levels.
14A Durbin–Wu Hausman test does not reject the the null hypothesis that the variable SOFT is exogenous. I have chosen
to employ IV techniques since it makes no difference to the results. In addition, a Pagan Hall test for homoskedasticity
was performed. The null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors in the IV regressions cannot be rejected.
17Table 5: Panel Regression Results
Variables OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PCGDP ¡1:539¤¤¤ ¡1:537¤¤¤ ¡1:356¤¤¤ ¡1:335¤¤¤ ¡1:303¤¤¤ ¡1:242¤¤¤
(-9.20) (-9.61) (-6.72) (-8.59) (-7.25) (-8.69)
SOFT ¡0:029¤¤¤ ¡0:036¤¤ ¡0:027¤¤¤ ¡0:037¤¤ ¡0:028¤¤¤ ¡0:035¤¤
(-3.37) (-2.35) (-3.29) (-2.47) (-3.65) (-2.21)
Additional
variables
EDUC – – ¡0:093¤¤ ¡0:084¤¤ ¡0:088¤ ¡0:093¤¤
(-2.09) (-2.03) (-1.82) (-2.09)
FI – – -0.013 -0.017 0.012 0.009
(-0.33) (-0.59) (0.31) (0.31)
R & D – – -0.145 ¡0:142¤
(-1.62) (-1.91)
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
R2–adjusted 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.76 0.95 0.95
Jarque Bera 1.75 2.88 7.09 5.34 6.44 7.96
(p–value) (0.417) (0.237) (0.029) (0.069) (0.04) (0.019)
Partial R2 0.20 0.18 0.18
F–test (1st) 5.50 4.86 4.67
(p–value) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015)
Hansen’s J–statistic 2.57 3.51 3.94
(p–value) (0.109) (0.061) (0.047)
Note: Dependent variable is the natural log of piracy rate. All estima-
tions carried out using STATA 8.0. A constant term and country dummies
variables were included in all regressions but are not reported. Robust t–
statistics are reported in parentheses. *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, **
Statistically signiﬁcant at 5% and * Statistically signiﬁcant at 10 %.
joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in the ﬁrst stage regression. In all these re-
gressions, our instruments were statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 per cent level.
In assessing the validity of 2SLS approach, in the ﬁnal row, we report the result of
Hansens’s J–statistic of overidentifying restrictions and the corresponding prob-
18ability associated with the null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with
the error term. In all speciﬁcations, we do not fail to accept the null hypothesis
that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
Turning on the regression coefﬁcients, the results are quite similar to OLS
estimation. The software coefﬁcient is negative and its magnitude is larger in
2SLS as compared with OLS estimates.
We now assess the robustness of our baseline speciﬁcation and focus on the
ﬁxed effects 2SLS estimates. Columns (4) and (6) report the regression results
when additional controls are included. All regression have a high explanatory
power. The regression results regarding both software protection index and in-
come are not affected substantially and we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on EDUC
variable is negative and signiﬁcant in the piracy equation conﬁrming that educa-
tion increases demand for intellectual property rights. We also ﬁnd that the FI
variable to have a negative effect on piracy rates complementing previous empir-
ical ﬁndings (Marron and Steel, 2000). Indeed, this effect appears to be positive
when R&D is added. Nevertheless, nones of these effects is signiﬁcant. Finally,
the R &D variable appears to be negatively correlated with piracy rates.
Summing up, the empirical results indicate that the level of software protec-
tion (law on the books and their enforcement) as well as per capita income have
inﬂuence on piracy rates. They also suggest the robustness of previous empirical
ﬁndings when additional controls are included in the baseline speciﬁcation.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we empirically investigate the relationship between software protec-
tion and piracy rates. For that purpose, a new measure of software protection for
24 European countries for the years 1994, 1997 and 2000 is constructed.
The regression results reveal that a weak protection of software might increase
19piracy. Per capita income appears to have a negative signiﬁcant effect on piracy
rates. They also suggest earlier empirical ﬁndings are quite robust.
This paper has also some policy implications. Given that software protection
can have larger impact on piracy than previously estimated. Consequently, pol-
icy makers should pay more attention how enforcement of IP laws is effectively
carried out.
Obviously, the current version of the software protection index has some lim-
itations. One extension is to include data on penalties, damages, delays in courts,
etc. Unfortunately, a major obstacle is that the majority of national laws indicates
whether or not there will be civil or criminal sanctions but does not go into the de-
tails (the length of jail sentences). The sample may be expanded to include more
countries and time periods. In spite of these shortcomings, this research not only
quantifes but also empirically links software protection to piracy.
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24Table 6: Index of Software Protection
Law Component
(1) International Membership Signatory Not signatory
Berne Convention 1
3 0












(1) Special 301 reviews Placed on
Priority Watch List 1
Watch List 2
Other observations 3
No reported problems 4
25Table 7: Index of Software Protection
Country Year Score Country Year Score
Austria 1994 5.32 Netherlands 1994 5.32
1997 6 1997 8
2000 8 2000 8
Belgium 1994 5.32 Norway 1994 5.32
1997 8 1997 6.68
2000 8 2000 6.68
Bulgaria 1994 2.68 Poland 1994 2
1997 2 1997 3.34
2000 6.68 2000 1.67
Czech Republic 1994 2.68 Portugal 1994 4
1997 3.99 1997 8
2000 3.34 2000 8
Denmark 1994 4 Romania 1994 1.32
1997 3.34 1997 3.99
2000 3.34 2000 3.34
Finland 1994 5.32 Russia 1994 0.99
1997 8 1997 0.67
2000 8 2000 0.67
France 1994 5.32 Slovakia 1994 1.32
1997 8 1997 4
2000 8 2000 6.68
Germany 1994 3 Slovenia 1994 1.32
1997 6 1997 8
2000 8 2000 8
Greece 1994 1.33 Spain 1994 2.66
1997 2 1997 8
2000 2 2000 4
Hungary 1994 2.68 Sweden 1994 4
1997 6 1997 3.34
2000 4 2000 8
Ireland 1994 5.32 Switzerland 1994 5.32
1997 4 1997 8
2000 4 2000 8
Italy 1994 2.66 United Kingdom 1994 4
1997 4 1997 8
2000 2 2000 8
Source: Constructed by the author from various legal sources (WIPO, UN-
ESCO, and national copyright laws 26